Volume II,Issue IV, March 2026
Volume-II, Issue-IV, March, 2026 |
Received: 25.03.2026 | Accepted: 27.03.2026 | ||
Published Online: 31.03.2026 | Page No: | ||
DOI: 10.69655/atmadeep.vol.2.issue.04W. | |||
বাক্যার্থবোধের স্বরূপ: ন্যায় ও বৈশেষিক মতের একটি পর্যালোচনা
রাহুল মান্না, গবেষক, দর্শন বিভাগ, যাদবপুর বিশ্ববিদ্যালয়, পশ্চিমবঙ্গ, ভারত |
The Nature of Sentence Meaning (Sentential Cognition): A Review of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika Perspectives Rahul Manna, Research Scholar, Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University, West Bengal, India | ||
ABSTRACT | ||
In the Nyāya system of philosophy, four kinds of valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) are accepted: perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna), and verbal testimony (śabda). In contrast, the Vaiśeṣika system recognizes only two pramāṇas, namely perception and inference. However, it is not tenable for the Veda-authoritative Vaiśeṣikas to deny the validity of śabda altogether. This raises an important question: do they accept the authority of the Veda while rejecting the validity of ordinary (laukika) verbal statements? Such a position is equally implausible, for without acknowledging the validity of ordinary linguistic communication, everyday practical life would become impossible. Therefore, the validity (prāmāṇya) of verbal cognition (śābdabodha) is implicitly accepted in both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems. While the Naiyāyikas accord śabda the status of an independent pramāṇa, the Vaiśeṣikas do not grant it such autonomy. Instead, they attempt to subsume verbal cognition under inference. To establish this, Vaiśeṣika philosophers advance two types of inferential models: padapakṣaka (word-based) inference and padārthapakṣaka (meaning-based) inference, both aimed at explaining sentence-meaning comprehension. According to the Vaiśeṣika view, just as the hetu (middle term) in inference functions in a specific manner to produce knowledge of the sādhya (probandum), so too does the word function in generating the cognition of sentence meaning. To properly understand this standpoint, it is necessary first to examine these two forms of inference accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas and critically evaluate their adequacy. Subsequently, by analyzing the nature of verbal cognition as understood by the Naiyāyikas, it becomes evident that the process of sentence-meaning comprehension (śābdabodha) is distinct from inferential cognition. This demonstrates why śabda must be regarded as an independent pramāṇa. Furthermore, it establishes that the causal conditions (kāraṇa and karaṇa) underlying inference are fundamentally different from those that give rise to verbal cognition. | ||
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